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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the relationship between the
benefits and the major objections expressed ove.- burden
sharing and international armaments cooperation. These
concerns include: (1) protectionism. (2) transfer of
technology and (3) bureaucratic problems. An analysis of
.these factors will be conducted through a case study of the
Fighter Support Experimental (FSX) project. It will be
conducted so as to determine the validity of the-e. benefits
and objections.
The objective of this thesis is to examine both the
benefits of burden sharing, and the objections raised
concerning armaments cooperation in relation to the FSX
project. The validity of the objections to the FSX
agreement will be analyzed in addition to how they relate to
future projects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the middle of this century the U.S. had a vibrant
and growing economy. After World War II. the economies of
most of the world were in shambles and the U.S. felt an
obligation to help rebuild and rejuvenate these countries.
In the 1970's and 1980's the Am'erican public was less
willing to shoulder the burden of defense for an alliance
and was' looking for ways 'in which the burden could be
shifted from the U.S. to other members of the alliance. One
way of shifting this burden was to participate in, and
encourage co-development projects. The Fighter Support
Experimental was just such a project.
This thesis will be a case study of the Fighter Support
Experimental (FSX) project. Using the case study framework.
it will concentrate on burden sharing and international
armaments cooperation and problems specific to the' FSX
project. 'It will provide an overview of burden sharing in
general and the benefits to, be derived from international
armaments cooperation. The political and economic
implications of burden sharing will be investigated arid the
major objections discussed.
A detailed review of the FSX program will be presented,
beginning with the decision to replace the aging fleet of
Japanese fighters and continuing through the approval of the
project by the President and Congress. Specific objections
to this project will be examined for validity.
A. BACKGROUND
The FSX project began in the mid 1980's with the
decision to replace the aging fleet of Japanese F-1 fighter
aircraft. There were originally three options available to
the J'panese for the :-eplacement of these airce-aft. The
first option was to buy foreign made fighters off the shelf.
The second option was to develop and produce the aircraft
domestically. The third option was to co-develop the
aircraft with a third country. Th~e co-development option
was chosen by the Japanese and the F-16 was, chosen as the
base aircraft to be modified to meet the needs of the
Japanese.
In the -beginning, the U.S. was afraid that another
country would be chosen and that the U.S. would be left out
of this project. After the Japanese chose the F-16 as the
base aircraft, the U.S. Congress began having second
thoughts about the project. They raised concerns about
"fair trade", and technology transfer. These concerns also
introduced the problem of bureaucracy into the negotiations.
The project was approved, but only after months of
infighting between executive agencies, and the executive and
legislative branches of government. There were those who
were concerned that the FSX project would, in the long run,
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providc the Japanese with the expertise to compete against
the U.S. in the world aerevpace market and. in the short
run. take jobs away froet '.S. citizer':.
This thesis will attempt to identify the main economic
concerns of burden sharing and international armaments
cooperation and how they were addressed in the FSX program.
It will discuss the' validity of these concerns and what can
be done in the future to alleviate these problems.
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis will begin by explaining the economics of
burden sharing and international armament cooperation. It
describes how the ' orld economic community can benefit when
each country produces items where they have a 'comparative
advantage. The next section will discuss in Ceneral the
problems that can arise from international cooperation.
Then a detailed review of the Fighter Support Experimental
(FSX) project will be presented. It will highlight some of
the more important prospects of the agreement. A thorough
discussion will be presented of the main problems and
objectives encountered in the project and the validity of
these objections. Finally. conclusions will be drawn about
the FSX project and recommendations will be made on avoiding
some of these problems in the future.
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II. BURDEN SHARING FROM Ikf ECONOMI¶C VIEW POINT
Defense burden sharing is concerned with the
contribution of each nation of an alliance to the ccenmon
defense of that alliance. The basic premise is that, in a
less hegemonic wurld, the financial and leadership
responsibilities should be diviled up so that the alliance
may endure and is efficient. In other words: the most
defense for the least cost, with a balance between a
nation'n costs and benefits. [Ref. l:p. 1]
In recent years the U.S. has grown to believe that it is
contributing more then its "fair share" in the area of
burden sharing. After WWII the economies of our enemies and
allies alike were in shambles. At that time, the U.S.
produced about 50 percent of the world's gross national
product (GNP). The U.S. felt an obligation to help rebuild
the other countries. Now Western Europe and Japan have
become strong economically and the U.S. is producing less
than 25 percent of the world's GNP. With the relative
decline in the U.S. GNP and the increase in the U.S. budget
deficit. tte U.S. public has become lese willing to shoulder
a large portion of alliance defense spending. As a
comparison of defense spending. in 1987 the U.S. spent 6.4
percent of its gross domestic product on defense, the
Japanese spent 1 percent of their gross domestic product on
4
d.,fense and the average Western Erropean country -:pent 3.3
percent of their gross domestic product on defense. In
dollars. the U.S. contributed 170 billion dollars to NATO
defense in 1.87, while the combined contribution of all
other NATO countries was 157 billion Because of the
perceived inequities, the U.S. is putting pressure on Japan
and NATO countrle3 to increase their contributions to the
mutual defense effort. [Ref. 1:p. 31
A problem with requesting that a country contribute its
fair share, is that a,"fair share" is not easily defined.
Everyone agrees that the burden should, be divided
efficiently and equitably. Efficiency, getting the best
level of total defense for the lowest possible cost, is
conceptually an easier concept to measure than true equity.
Paradoxically. however, it often taxes a back-seat in the
burden sharing controversy. Instead, various equity
measures are pushed to the forefront of the burden sharing
discussion which advance and reflect each group's national
interests. Some' of the equity measures used by world powers
include total contribution, per capita contribution. percent
of gross' national product' and percent of gross domestic
product. These measures of equity do not entirely gauge a
country's contribution. [Ref. 1:p. 1] A further discussion
of equity meajurep wil" appear later in this section.
S~5
A.- DEFENSE AS A' PUBLIC GOOD
Equity issues in- defense expenditures arise largely
because defense is considered a public good. A public good
is one that provides non-rival and non-excludable benefits.
Non-rival means that the use by one person does not exclude
the use of the item by another person. In the case of
defense, it is argued.that if defense is provided for one
person it does not mean that his neighbor will be any less
protected. The non-excludable property of a public good
makes it impossible, or' prohibitively expensive, to exclude
nonpayers from the benefits of a p'oduct. In the case of
defense, in a told war setting. if one man does not
contribute to the common defense it is virtually impossible
to exclude him from receiving the benefits of the protection
which is provided to everyone else This non-excludability
property may not be the case in a post cold war environment,
as will be discussed later, [Ref. 2:p. 4]
This leads to the problem of nonpayers with respect to a
public good. Those who do not pay for a service, or pay
less than they should. are called free riders. The free
rider decreases the amount of the'.'total good provided.
'Because consumers have free access to public goods provided
by others. everyone will contribute less than he would if he
could only consume the goods provided by his expenditures.
This also shifts the burden to those who value the good most
highly. [Ref. 3:p. 43] As an example: if a person values
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public TV, but knows that it will be provided whether he
contributes or not. then that person has the. incentive to
decrease his contribution or not pay at all. The person who
places a higher value on public TV and is willing to pay for'
it will have to increase his 'contribution to keep public TV
on the air. Public TV is an example of a public good, as
*its use by one person does not diminish its use by another
person (non-rivalrous), as long as they both have TV sets
and are within the reception area. This good also meets the
non-exclusion requirement in that it is impossible, to keep
the nonpayers from tuning in to the public channel without
the use of a scrambler, which in the case of public TV would
be prohibitively expensive.
The contribution of the person who values public TV
highly will not be enough to make up for the total amount
lost due to the free rider, so less public TV will be
provided. Similarly with defense, the country who values
the defense alliance the most will not make up -,for the free
riders, so less total defense will be provided 'for the
alliance. The larger the' number of ' individuals or
countries, the higher the incentive not, to contribute and
the less of the'good that,will be provided. [Ref. 3:pp. 43-
47]
Olson and Zeckhauser have shown that if one country
values defense more than another country. all other
characteristics being the same. then defense. spending of the
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two countries will be disproportionate. The country that
values defense less will spend less because it is satisfied
with less defense. Part of its defense requirement is being
fulfilled by the country that requires more defense.
Because of free riding. the total defense provided will be
less than optimal. (Ref. 3 :pp. 43-47)
While defense is a public good inside a country, it is
not a pure public good among an alliance. To be a pure
ublic good it must be non-excludable and non-rival, this is
not the case in an alliance. In an alliance, conventional
and nuclear forces could be withheld from the defense of a'
country that does not provide its share of the common
defense. In addition, with a limited number of forces and
with the logistic problems of moving troops, the use of'
forces in one area could prevent their use in another area.
(Ref. .l:p. 4]
Nuclear protection is non-rival in that the. threat of a
retaliatory nuclear stri e in defense of one' country will
not detract from the hreat,, of a retaliatory strike in,
defense of another count .As nuclear protection is more
non-rival than conventional forces, an alliance might be
less inclined to exclude a member from its nuclear umbrella
due to free riding. Since the cost of additional members in
* , the nuclear umbrella protection. in the past. has been much
smaller than the marginal gains due to the members'
military, economic and olitical contribution to the cause
of the alliance. As the potential use of nuclear wtapons
decreases with nuclear disarmament treaties., the problems
associated with free riders should also decrease as
alliances become more dependent on conventional (more
excludable and rival) forces. [Ref. 1:p. 41
B. ALLIES, ADVERSARIES, AND COMMITMENT
Recent authors have put forth the idea that defense
spending in an alliance is not a perfect public good. Thus.
free riding is not the only determinant of defense
expenditures. Defense expenditures also depend on each
nation's commitment ' to the alliance, the actions of the
adversaries of an alliance and the allies that make up an
alliance. [Ref. 4:p. 1]
1. CoauItment
The members of an alliance must have the military
capability to inflict unacceptable losses on' an aggressor
and the commitment to use those forces. One of. these
elements without the other will not produce a deterrence.
The aggressor must believe that the alliance members will
use their, nuclear and conventional forcos in the face of
* aggression or these forces become worthless as a deterrent.
It is not only the aggressor that •must be convinced of the
commitment of a nation, but also the nation's allies. If a
nation's allies believe that the member in not totally
committed to the alliance in a particular area, ti. allies
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will increase their defense spending to make up part of the
deterrence. This idea, along with threat perceptions
(discussed later), will have serious implications with the
arms treaties and other recent developments in Europe.
[Ref. 4:p. 71
2. Adversaries
The actions of expected adversaries will also affect
the level of defense spending by alliance members. If the
threat is perceived, to diminish, such as the 1989-90
diminished threat from the Soviets in Europe, the defense
spendi -, of member nations will be expected to decrease, all
else being equal. This was the expected reaction of the
1991 U.S. defense budget. Thus the actions and perceptions
of potential adversaries will affect the defense spending of
alliance members. [Ref. 4:p. 261
3. Allies
The actions of allies in an alliance will affect the
defense spending of each individual member of the alliance.
As an example, if the U.S. begins to withdraw troops and
short-medium range nuclear weapons from Europe. the defense
spending of other NATO countries may' not decrease by as much
as it would otherwise. The withdrawing of missiles and
troops could increase the threat perceived by the other
members and cause them to adjust their defense budgets
accordingly. [Ref. 4:p. 271
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The defense budgets of individual members of an
alliance fill depend on many forces outide 'of its control.
As shown, it will depend on the commitments of its allies,
the actions of potential adversaries and the actions of
other members of the alliance.
C. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
A nation Will increase its defense spending when
incentives exist for them to do so. As circumstances change
in Europe and in the Pacific Rim, countries will change
their defense spending in response to the change in their
perceived benefits from the alliance. As nations respond to
changing conditions, equity and efficiency in international
defense alliances arf likely to remain controversial issues.
At least three conditions will be important: the, level of
the perceived threat, the measure3 of equity and the mix of
resources contributed by each country. [Ref 2:p. 8)
1. The Percsived Threat
A major issue in burden sharing is determining how
much defense is enough. This' issue stems from a perception
of the threat. In general, the U.S. considers the threat to
be larger than its allies do. This will cause the U.S. to
require a larger defense force than would be required by our
allies. Also, the U.S. tends to think in terms of a
flexible defense effort. The U.S. wants the ability to
react with both conventional 'forces and nuclear weapons.
11.
The Europeans tend to think of nuclear retaliation for any
Soviet aggression as the tactic of choice. Since nuclear
weapons are cheaper than conventional forces, and primarily
provided by the United States, the Europeans can justify
their lower defense spending by advocating the use of
nuclear weapons. The U.S. and European nations both have
reason to try to overstate their case. The U.S. exaggerates
its case to get other countries to provide more defense and
the.Europeans overstate their case to decrease their defense
spending. hoping that the U.S. will make up the difference.
[Ref. i:p. 51
As circumstances change in Europe, the perceived
threat and the value of the alliance will change. For
example, a Conventional Forces Europe treaty could lower the
value of the NATO alliance and also provide a more concrete
consensus on the nature of the threat. This is likely to be
used by the allies as reason to decrease defense spending.
"A number of Congressional Staffers familiar with the issue
have pointedout that the question is now who gets to take
the most cuts in a CFE agreement." [Ref. 2:p. 81 It has
been observed that "...the @issue (for Europeans) may be
burden-shedding rather than burden sharing." [Ref. 2:p. 81
Thethreat percantion question is not only prevalent
in NATO, but it is als,• an issue in Japan. Many Japanese
tend to believe that the Soviet military in the area is
pointed at China and not at Japan. [Ref. 5:p. 2631 They
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believe that a superpower nuclear war will never happen.
This is due to the belief that a major nuclear war would be
suicidal, and therefore no one would start it. There are,
however, some young Japanese defense experts who perceive a
greater threat and therefore believe that Japan should
undertake a larger share of the defense burden. Some
Japanese believe that the U.S. is oriented more towards
Europe and point out that this is also a reason for Japan to
increasa its defense effort. [Ref. 5:p. 2681
Some past Soviet actions that may have changed
Japan's threat perception are:
1. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
2. The deployment of Soviet troops in the Northern
Territories of Etoroty, Shikotan. and Kunashiri and
the Habomai Islands.
3. The deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and Backfire bombers
in eastern USSR.
4. The build-up of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, particularly
the deployment of the Soviet carriers Minsk and
Novorossijsk as well as the nuclear-powered guided
missile cruiser Frunze to the Pacific.'
5. Soviet expansionism moves in Ethiopia. Angola and
Vietnam. [Ref. 6:p.41
It remains to be seen how the changes in Europe will
effect the Japanese threat perception.
2. Measures of Equity.
Another, problem connected with defining a "fair
share" in burden sharing is defining a fair distribution. A
fair distribution of burden should match a nation's
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proportional contribution with the proportional benefits it
receives. However, this is not easy to achieve. Everyone
agrees that the distribution should be fair, but a measure
of fairness has not been found. [Ref. 1;p. 6] U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State William Taft wrote:
Critics of our alliance system contend that the U.S.
bears far more than its fair share of the cost of the
alliance. The key evidence they cite 4n support of their
claim in most cases is statistical; the fact that,
measured in terms of the percent of gross domestic
product, the U.S. spends almost twice as much on defense
as its average NATO ally.... For the critics, this fact
clinches the argument, and all that remains is to decide
whether we will insist on our allies spending more' on
defense or we'll simply do less ourselves. [Ref. 7:p.
16]
While the U.S. tries to'tie burden sharing to hard
numbers, such as gross national product (GNP) or per capita
spending, our allies point out that other factors must be
considered in describing what is' "fair". For instance, the
Europeans point out that they may spend less on defense, but
everything they do spend goes for the protection of Europe.
In contrast, the total U.S. defense spending is spread
throughout the world. (Ref., 6.:p. 151 The U.S. could
counter this argument by pointing out that the Soviet threat
in Europe may be decreased by the possibility of allied
retaliation in other parts of the world. For instance, a
Soviet attack in Europe could be countered by a U.S. attack
on Soviet positions 'in the Pacific Rim, thereby increasing
the scope of the war. The Europeans al'so point out that the
14'
cost of economic assistance provided to less developed NATO
countries is not considered when looking only at these
statistics.
There are many non-quantifiable costs that are born
by our allies in defense of the alliance. These costs would
include the presence of foreign troops in a country,,
military equipment in the streets and military aircraft
overhead. Estimates indicate that in 1989 West Germany had
nine soldiers per square mile, this compares with .4 in the
U.S. There is also the cost of land provided for troops in
the allied countries. (Ref. 7 :p. 15]
General John W. Vassey Jr. made the -following
comparison with regard to West Germany:
If you multiply the population of Oregon by 20, give each
person a car, arm one million of them, bring in another
half-million armed foreigners, put 50,000, armored
vehicles and 100,000 wheeled vehicles on the roads and
put a couple thousand jets in the air, then at least the
Oregonians would know what the Germans put up with.
[Ref. 7:p. 261,
President Reagan, when dealing with the. Japanese,
decided not to emphasize GNP as a measure of "fair share,",
but to use'the roles and missions approach. This approach
would assign each country a mission and let them decide what
resources were needed to accomplish -that mission, instead'
of. trying to place a monetary value on their contribution.
His administration advocated that the Japanese provide for
the defense of the Japanese island and 'for the defense of
the sea lanes out to 1000 miles. This idea of roles and
S15 .
missions may be a much more equitable approach to the
sharing of defense. However, this approach still leaves
open the question of who gets what role and the adequacy of
expenditures to complete their role. [Ref 7:p. 50]
Th.ere is no generally accepted index for measuring a
"fair share" and different indexes give different results.
Because of these problems, the index to be used is likely to
be a source of contention in the foreseeable future.
3. The Mix of Resources Contributed by Each Country
Another major. stumbling block in burden sharing is
the choice of the optimal mix of resources. This mix
includes troops, supplies, munitions, aircraft, ships,
support personnel etc. "If the mix of resources is
inefficient, either the level of defense capability could be'
increased without increasing total expenditures. or
expenditures could be reduced without reducing the level of
defense capacity." [Ref 1:p. 12] This perfect efficiency
would require complete cooperation among allies on the
defense strategy, the materials needed to carry out that
strategy and perfect ination about the type of strategy
needed. Due to, these obstacles, perfect efficiency will
never be-achieved. [Ref 1:p. 131
The issue of efficiency is a question of not only
what is the proper mix, but also who should contribute what
resource. To achieve efficiency, each member should
contribute the resource where they have a comparative
16
advantage. For equity, each member should contribute items
that balance their benefits and contribu*ions. [Ref. 1:p.
13]
The principle of comparative advantage states thdt a
country should produce and export those products that it
produces most efficiently (relative to other products) and
import those items that another country produces more
efficiently. When the principle is adhered to. then all
trading countries gain. This gain resuits because world
output is larger when each country produces what it can
produce best. [Ref. 8:p. 371]
To illustrate the idea of comparative advantage,.
suppose that the U.S. can'produce 200 bushels of corn or 100
TV sets, while Japan can only produce 5.bushels of corn or
20 TV sets with the same resources (reference Table 1).
Although the U.S. can produce more of each, it is possible
to increase, the world's production of both by having the
U.S.' produce more corn and Japan produce more TV sets. This
is because the margin of advantage that each country has for
a particular product is different. The U.S. can produce 20
times as much corn 'as Japan with the same resources, but it
can produce only 5 times as many TV' sets. This gives Japan
a comparative advantage in TV sets but a comparative
disadvantage in corn. [Ref. 9:p. 777]
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TABLE 2. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
TABLE 1
corn (bushels) TV sets
U.S. 200 100
Japan 20
If the U.S. moves one tenth of a unit of resource
from TV sets to corn and Japan mon'.ves one unit of resource
from corn production to TV sets then the total production of
corn will go up by 15 units and the total production of TV
sets will go up 10 units. This change is indicated in Table
2 below. [Ref. 9:p. 777]
TABLE 2. TOTAL PROWUCTION
TABLE 2





As long as there- is a margin t advantag, ._n one
area over another, the total world production will go up
when one area specializes in the productwhere it has a
comparative advantage. [Ref. 9:p, 777]
* 18
In an alliance where members are free to determine
Uh 1 content cf their contributions, efficiency is frequently
compromised because of national objectives. In particular,
expenditures on different resources hold different benefits
fcr a countr1y. The presence of a military base and the use
of local labor may help the local economy in the area around
the base. However,. development and production of a high
technology weapons system may help not only the immediate
local economy, but also provide spinoff technology that can
be used in other defense and civilian industrie3. This high
tech item could impact the country's international trade
relations and balance of payments. It could also increase a
country's international prestige. The high tech production
could do all of this without the problems associated with
having foreign troops stationed in the country. Thus,
countries may attempt to make contributions to the alliance
in areas that they do not have a comparative advantage, but
which will satisfy other national objectives. This reduces
efficiency. [Ref. 1:p. 13]
D. INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS COOPERATION
One way of increasing efficiency and equity., while
lowering the defense budget of each individual nation, is
international armaments agreements. These agreements could
reduce research and development costs, promote
standardization and interoperability among the alliance and
19
open new international markets for the cooperating nations.
In times of U.S defense cuts, these new markets would be
extremely important to the U.S. defense industry. [Ref.
2:p. 13]
International armaments agreements were advocated by the
Reagan Administration. In the Fiscal Year 1990 Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Report on Allied
Contributions, Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated a U.S.
goal of increasing cooperative program investments from the
current 3 percent to 25 percent by the year 2000. "OSD
estimated that signed agreements presented an opportunity to
save over 70 percent on the costs associated with pursuing
such projects unilaterally." [Ref. 2 :p. 13]' Carlucci noted
the following benefits of increased cooperation:
1. reducing dupl:cation among allied weapons systems
2. ,producing better products by sharing technologies
3. improving interoperability
-i. achieving economies of scale more quickly
5. bolstering U.S. industrial competitiveness. [Ref.
2:p.13]
In addition to the benefits listed above, increased
cooperation will also increase the high tech industries of
our allies, create larger markets forthem and help'European
leaders defend their military budgets. It will also cut down
on the free rider problem as cooperative agreements are
excludable by their nature. [Ref'. 2:p. 30]
20
International trade in general is considered important
in order for countries to achieve, and mtintain. a high
standard of living. With trade there will be
specialization, each person or country doing what it does
best and purchasing from others those goods and services
that it can not efficiently produce. Without trade. the
world will. have an extremely low standard of living, with
each country, or person, having to produce everything it
needs. There are still many obstacles to these
international armaments agreements, some of which will *be
discussed in the next section, but politicians may be
becoming more willing to adopt policicri that economists have
advocated for years.'
21
III. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BURDEN SHARING AND
INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS COOPERATION
After WWII, when we produced 50 percent of the world's
GNP and held a technological advantage, independence worked
well for the United States. However-. our share of world GNP
has dropped to 20-25 percent. The U.S. is competing against
nations with a highly skilled, yet sometimes less costly,
labor force and in some areas U.S. technology may no longer
be superior. [Ref. 10:p. 121 "The economic success of our
competitors makes it virtually impossible,,and prohibitively
expensive to retain self-sufficiency as a national security
goal." [Ref. 10:p. 121 But. while International Armaments
Agreements would provide benefits as shown in section two.
not everyone is convinced that cooperation with other
nations would be beneficial. This section will provide an
overview of four objections to this cooperation. The major
objections expressed about burden sharing and international
armaments cooperation are:
1. the issue of foreign dependence
2. protectionism
3. the transfer of U.S technology
4. bureaucratic nroblems
A. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE
A major concern to many is the extent to which the U.S.
is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign nations for
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its weapons systems, components and sub-systems. This
dependency includes items produced both by foreign companies
and U.S. companies in factories overseas. As examples the
following have been identified as foreign sole-source
suppliers to the U.S.: the United 'Kingdom for the TR-41
engines in the A-7 aircraft; West Germany for precision
optical glass; France and Spain for hexachlorethane for
smoke bombs: and Switzerland for self-illuminating light
sources. Many U.S. companies produce the bulk of their
products in other countries, due in part to foreign labor
becoming more technologically proficient while remaining
lower paid than domestic labor. Many U.S. factories are
having a hard time remaining competitive in the face of
proficient low paid foreign labor. Motorola. for example.
produces all of its microelectronics in Mexico. [Ref. 1O:p.
6]
To understand how dependent the U.S. is on foreign
countries for its weapons systems. a Mobilization Concept
Development 'Center report found that of 13 weapons systems
studied, the U.S. would be unable to produce 8 of these
systems if foreign supplies were cut off. Included in these
systems are the Sparrow Missile, the M-i tank, sonobuoys,
the F/A-18 and the F-16: some of our newest and most
advanced systems. [Ref. 1O:p. 61
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1. Disruptions of Supply
The concern expressed over foreign dependence is
that external supply lines will be disrupted, either through
embargoes or blocked transportation lanes, in time of
conflict. [Ref. 11:p. 5] The Defense Science Board voiced
these- concerns when they asked. "What would prevent the
government of a county in which critical U.S. components are
manufactured from stopping production export in response to
dissatisfaction with American foreign policy?" [Ref. 11:p.
5]
The same concern exists over foreign dependence on
raw materials as well as manufactured goods. 'These raw
materials include oil. nickel and platinum. A solution used
for the problem of dependence on strategic minerals has been
to stockpile the materials. The U.S. has been doing this
for years. [Ref. 11:p. 5] While this is an answer for raw
materials, it will not work as well for manufactured goods.
Some manufactured goods require maintenance and/or
upgrading. 'They are susceptible to deterioration and
subject to obsolescence. Obsolescence of manufactured goods
in storage could become enormously expensive for the
stockpiling country.
A more suitable solution than stockpiling. for both
raw materials & manufactured goods, is to cultivate more
than one supplier. If the U.S. purchases vital goods from
only one country, such as aircraft engines from England. it
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would be relatively easy to stop that one source from
delivering a product to the U.S. If. however, a
manufactured :ood is produced by more than one source-it
would be fai more difficult to interrupt delivery. For
instance, if the same aircraft engine could be procured from
England, Japan and Canada. there would be little chance of
the disruption of all three supply sources simultaneously.
The geography ofnat2ons also influences the danger
of a supply line disruption. It would be much harder for an
aggressor to affect the shipment of materials to the U.S.
from Canada or Mexico, than ' it would be to affect the
shipment of goods from Japan or Europe. The geographic
location of trading partners will also effect the potential
threat of supply disruption and therefore the number of
suppliers needed.
Of concern to the U.S.,.in addition to' supply lines
being cut by an aggressor, is the withholding of a product
by a supplier. The chance of this happening is also
decreased with multiple suppliers. The withholding of vital
materials would also depend on the relationship with the
.purchasing country. For instance, Japan depends heavily on
the U.S. for its defense. It is therefore unlikely, that
Japan would willingly withhold vital materials from the U.S.
during a conflict. (Ref. 11:p. 911
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2. Engineering Ability
Another problem associated with foreign dependency
is the loss of U.S. engineering ability. If the U.S.
becomes dependent on other countries for our high technology
weapons systems, it is plausible that the U.S. could
gradually lose its ability to design and produce these
goods. Some fear that "... the U.S. could conceivably
become similar to many Third-World nations who currently
rely on U.S. technological training for their state-of-the-
art military expansion." [Ref. 11:p. 6] This loss of
engineering ability also includes the loss of research and
development (R&D) benefits to other industries. "Economic
studies have shown that the rate of return of R&D to society
as a whole is double the return to individual firms pering
it." [Ref. 11:p. 6]
There is another side to the argument concerning
lss of engineering ability. This group argues that
historically, high tech items have been developed and
refined in the U.S.. and then produded overseas' and
imported. When these products are in the beginning stages
of their life-cycle, there needs to be close communication
between producers., customers and suppliers. However. as the,
products become highly standardized, the need for this
closer comnmunication is drastically reduced. [Ref. 12:p.
2061 History has borne out this pattern as new products are
introduced in the U.S. and exported. Then. as the product
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matures and standardizes, production moves overseas and the
product is imported. This clears the way for U.S.
scientists and engineers to develop the newy generation of
products. Thus. foreign dependency does not necessarily
mean'a loss' of engineering ability, but may clear the way
for new products.
Those that fear the loss of U.S. engineering ability
should consider the effect that total self-dependence has
had on the Soviet Union. This policy has lead to
technically inferior forces and domestic economic chaos. It
is very expensive to attempt, and impossible to achieve,
leadership in every field. As was pointed out in section
two., one of the benefits of international trade and
comparative advantage is that there is more for everyone at
a lower price.
Even with the benefits of international, trade
discussed in section two and above, the U.S. dependence on
foreign production for a large portion of its weapons
systems does raise' concern for our ability to fight a
prolonged war if supplies are. disrupted during. a confl1ictor
for political reasons. If, however;' -the war is short, this
argument' becomes less relevant. Foreign dependence also




"Protectionism ... is the regulation of trade between the
residents of different countries for the supposed benefit of
certain home country residents." [Ref. 11:p. 9] There are
many reasons for the protectionist sen.iment. One of the
biggest reasons, and one of great concern to individual
congressmen. is the protection of domestic goods and support
for domestic, in-district, industries. There, is a sentiment
that the market share of domestic producers must be
protected against cheaper foreign goods. It is, often
claimed that these foreign goods are being produced at less
cost due to government subsidization and cheaper foreign
labor. Also given as reasons for protectionism are the
preservation of national product standards (such as
automobile pollution standards), national security concerns
and the "maintenance of the overall health of the domestic
economy". [Ref. 11:p. 9]
To satisfy the protectionists' objectives, several
methods of regulation have been introduced. These methods
include the following:
1. tariffs--(schedules of duties on imports) not as
prevalent as in past years due to international
agreements
2. additional charges--above and beyond the normal
customs duty on certain imports
3. import quotas--which directly limit the amount of a
conmnodity that may be imported during a given period
of time (consumers do not enjoy lower prices when
import quotas are'enacted, while domestic producers
essentially receive a quota profit in addition to
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maintaining'a secure and less competitive market for
their product)
4. export quotas---in the name of national security
certain products are restricted in both numbers and
destination (one of the more publicized examples was
the ban on the sale of various computer systems to
Eastern Bloc Nations imposed by the Reagan
Administration)
5. voluntary export restrictions--rather than risk even
sterner measures, some countries voluntarily restrict
exports to other countries (Australia, New Zealand and
other 'beef producing nations voluntarily restricted
exports of beef to the U.S. from 1.968-1971 rather than
trigger automatic quotas under the Meat Import Act;
Japan voluntarily restricted its export of cotton
textiles to the U.S. during the 1950s and. more
recently, Japan cut back its exports of automobiles*
and semiconductors to the U.S. in reaction to U.S.
pressure)
6. a•nti-dumping legislation--dumping refers to the sale
in foreign markets of products below prices charged in
home markets for the same products (according to
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs ard
Trade (GATT), such sales are only considered unfair
and subject to anti-dumping duties when they are also
injurious to U.S. producers of similar products).
[Ref. 11:p. 10]
The protectionist sentiments have spawned "Buy-American"
rules. This is legislation that requires Federal agencies
to buy American made products, even if these products are
more expensive than foreign products ci equal or superior
quality. This decreases, the amount' of defense the public
gets for their dollar. The "Buy American" sentiment is
attractive to labor unions, domestic industries and Congress
(because of constituent interests). However. it would be
better for the Department of Defense to buy the best and
most cost effective technology wherever it can be obtained.
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Obtaining the best technology available may actually force
the domestic industries to upgrade their products. [Ref.
11:p. 90)
Protectionism. while meeting the needs of many special
interest groups, goes against the ideas of trade expressed
in section two. Protectionism does not allow for the free
flow of goods and ination between countries and is therefore
not conducive to international armaments cooperation.
C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
"One of the principle means of keeping the U.S. military
ahead of the Soviet Union has been through the use of
technologically superior weapons." (Ref. 11:p. 28] This
technological superiority has been used by the U.S. and its
allies to counter the numerically superior Warsaw Pact
Forces. If the U.S. loses this superiority, there are only
two choices of action:, (1) a massive build up of military
forces or (2) the acceptance of a decreased level of
security. One way to maintain this level of technological
superiority is to take advintage of the synergism that is
created when the strengths of various nations are focused on
a project. However. not everyone is convinced that
International Armaments Cooperation with other countries is
beneficial.
There are competing views, mainly among Congress. the
Department of Defense, and the Conmm6rce Department, on how
30
to take advantage of the technological and financial gains
offered by cooperative R&D efforts, while protecting U.S.
industrial competitiveness and long term national security
interests. For instance. Senator Alan Dixon has argued that
an aerospace deal with Korea will strengthen Korea's
aerospace industry at the expense of the U.S. aerospace
industry. Congress is concerned that the transfer of U.S.
technology will hurt the U.S industrial base as a whole.
[Ref. 2:pp. 16-17]
A major problem with the transfer of technology is that
many of our security partners are .lso our trading
partners/competitors. Joint cooperation on military R&D
projects also provides our R&D partners, and economic
competitors, with spinoff technology that can be used to
compete with U.S. domestic industries. However, not
participating in these joint R&D projects could also cause
the U.S. defense industry to miss out on technological
advances that could be used to compete for defense
contracts, both overseas and domestically.
The Defense Department has recognized both sides of this
argument, and in November 1989 the- Defense Science Board
Task Force supported increased defense cooperation between
U.S. and Pacific Rim Nations. It emphasized that
cooperation must involve two way technology transfers. It
stated "...that we must explicitly link cooperative defense
sharing issues with economic issues. including the trade-.
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balance and market a:cess." [Ref. 2 :p. 14] The Defense
Science Board also stated that relations with the Pacific
Rim Nations may be more complex than with NATO nations
because of trade relations with these nations. (Ref. 2:p.
14]
It has been argued that, in light of reduced defense
spending by the U.S., the U.S. defense industry would,
benefit from shared technological resources and more open
markets., If the U.S. is to maintain its technological.
superiority it must use every avenue to stay in the lead.
Cooperative R&D projects are one ,way for U.S. defense
industries to stay on the cutting edge of technology.
D. BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS
The bureaucracy of the U.S. makes it difficult to
establish international armaments agreements. There are
four departments that oversee and regulate U.S. exports:
the State Department. the Department of, Defense. the
Department of Commerce. and' Congress. With this much
supervision,, there are many regulations that must be
satisfied before an arms agreement. can be signed.
This kind of uncertainty, in addition to the instabi'lity
associated with the U.S. defense budget process. makes
foreigners - especially Europeans - wary, of entering into
cooperative agreements with the United States. Even
after large R&D expenditures by foreign nations, no
guarantee exists that these investments will not be lost
if the U.S. must pull out of an agreement due to
budgetary pressure. [Ref. 2:p. 29]
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Thr iorld has changed since the late 50's to early 60's
when America :ould afford to be self-sufficient. In the
1990's many of the ideas of that time will be counter-
productive. We' can no longer afford the "Buy American"
policies that once prevailed in :this- country.
Diversificrcion is not only a way of obtaining the lowest
cost products, but it is a way of forcing American producers
to continue research and development to keep up with the
competition. both foreign and domestic. Purchasing from
several sources will also lessen the problem of foreign
dependence. As stated in this section. purchasing items
from more than one source provides alternatives if one
provider is disrupted. This means that the U.S. must be
willing to pay a little more for some items so that the most
efficient producer does not become the only producer of a
product. While we' want the lowest cost items. the
additional cost paid to a less efficient producer could be
considered the premium for a more reliable System.
While international armaments cooperation agreements
have many advantages as discussed in section one, they also
have many problems that must be considered as discussed in
this section. The following sections will outline the
background of the Fighter Support Experiment&,' (FSX)
cooperative joint venture project involving the United
States and Japan, and discuss objections, and the validity
of these objections. in the U.S. and Japan. Many of the
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advantaqes and problems discussed in chapters two and three
will be highlighted using the FSX as a case study.
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IV, THE FIGHTER SUPPORT EXPERIMENTAL
The Fighter Support Experimental (FSX) is a new
generation of fighter aircraft based on General Dynamics'
F-16. It involves a joint venture agreement between
America's General Dynamics and Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries. The final agreement was shaped by international
business opportunities and constraints, in addition to a
"...political process which dictated that neither economic
or security considerations were paramount, but that the two
were inextridably intertwined." [Ref. 13:p. 1] This
section will describe the events leading to the FSX co-
development agreement with highlights on some of the
significant events. Following sections will discuss the
objections, and the validity of these objections in detail.
A. BACKGROUND
The FSX project started in 1984/1985 with the Japanese
decision to replace its 1960 vintage fleet of F-i jet'
fighters. While the F-i was developed primarily as a close-
in support aircraft for ground -forces, the Japanese Defense
Agency (JDA) wanted the replacement .aircraft to have an
expanded role and capability. The replacement was to be a
longer range. more advanced fighter. It would be a
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multipurpose aircraft with modifications for air combat.
sea-lane surveillance and anti ship capability.
Specifically, the FSX would be required to have a top speed
of mach two, a maximum payload of 22,000 lbs. and a range of
500 miles with four air-to-surface missiles. To that end,
the Japanese Defense Agency conducted a study in September
1985 to find a replacement aircraft. [Ref. 13:p. 61
B. PRODUCTION OPTIONS
When the selection began. three options were considered.
The first option was to use an existing domestic Japanese
model and modify it, to meet the FSX requirements. The
second option was to modify a foreign produced fighter,
under license. The third option was to develop and produce
an upgraded fighter domestically. [Ref. 13:p. 6]
There was strong support for developing and producing
the aircraft domestically, particularly among the Japanese
Air Self-Defense Force, che JDA and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). JDA's technical
research and development determined that it was possible to
do this, domestically, with the exception of the proposed
engine. but it would take 10 years. Some of the reasons for
producing the fighter domestically were:
1. Reducing Japan's reliance on the U.S. for weapons and
aircraft.
2. Maintaining the market share that Japan held with the
F-1.
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3. Providing increased application of advanced Japanese
technology in weapons systems.
4. Providing the Japanese ordinance industry with an
attractive, long term, expensive project.
[Ref. 13: p. 6]
An article for the Japan Quarterly stated that:
While Japan has made technological advances in alynost all
fields, including rocketry, it lags far behind in
aeronautics. The Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, which once promoted the domestic development of
a civilian plane, endorsed domestic development of the
FSX as an alternative. Both the ministry and the
ordinance industry viewed the FSX project as the last
chance in this century to rebuild the Japanese aviation
industry. [Ref. 13:p. 7]
While Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and four other
Japanese defense related companies lobbied for domestic
development, the JDA Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought up
the possibility of an international arrangement. Inquiries
about modifications and/or, licensing agreements for co-
production or technical assistance identified four
possibilities: the European Tornado produced by the British;
the French and German Panvia; the 'F-16 produced in the U.S.
by General Dynamics; or the F/A-18 produced in the U.S. by
McDonnell Douglas. [Ref. 13:p. 8]
The JDA sent letters to the foreign defense contractors
that built these four aircraft. These letters inquired
about modifications the countries would allow to their
planes to meet FSX specifications. The July 1986 replies
ruled out the European produced Tornado. [Ref. 13:p. 91
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JDA study groups were sent to both 3eneral Dynamics and
McDonnell Douglas. In late 1986, Kurihara Yuko, then the
Director General of the JDA. reported to the Japanese
National Security Council the study groups' conclusions and
recommended additional study of the joint development option
with an American firm. [Ref. 13:p. 9)
The JDA report and Kurihara Yuko's recommendation were
the first setbacks for the domestic development proponents.
All of this came at a time of increasing American pressure
over the trade imbalance and burden sharing. [Ref. 13:p. 91
C. FSX ISSUE IN THE U.S.
By the summer of 1986, the FSX was a political issue
between Japan and the U.S. The U.S. defense contractors
were becoming concerned that the U.S. 'would be denied access
to another part of the Japanese market. At this time. the
main concern was to ensure participation of the U.S. in the
development and production of the FSX. The issues of
technology transfer and American protectionism had yet to be-
addressed. (Ref. 13:p. 9)
1. FSX Under the Reagan Administration
In early 1987 the Reagan -Administration and several
members of Congress had started to pressure Japan to
purchase a U.S. fighter off the shelf or to jointly develop
the FSX with an American Fighter as the baseline.
According to Richard Grimmett and Larry Niksch of the
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service:
38
"Othe: proposals in Congress reportedly called on Japan
to purchase outright 100 U.S.' fighters. The U.S.
bargaining position was strengthened by the massive U.S.
trade deficit with Japan ($59 billion in 1987), by the
consequent congressional concern with Japanese trade
barriers, and the controversy and Japanese embarrassment
over the Toshiba Corporation's export of sensitive
materials to the Soviet Union in violafion of the
Coordination Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) regulations.' [Ref. 13:p. 10]
In June 1987, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger
went to Japan to advocate a cooperative production
arrangement. In October of 1987 a joint development plan
for the FSX was adopted by U.S. and Japanese defense
officials. The plan called for the use of General Dynamics'
F-16C fuselage as the base aircraft 'of the FSX, with some
structural modifications and additional new electronics.
[Ref. 13:p. 11]
Broad outlines were drawn up in October 1987, but
negotiations on the project continued for over a year. At
issue were: (1) the financial return to participating
companies, (2) the extent of their involvement in the design
and manufacture of .the FSX'and (3) agreement for American
firms to receive Japanese technology applied to the
aircraft. [Ref. 13:p. 121
2. 'Congressional Concerns
In April 1988. members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee published their concern that the U.S. was
subsidizing foreign advanced weapons development to the
detriment of the U.S. aerospace industry. The concern was
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that the transfer of U.S. technology to Japan would be
counterproductive for the U.S. This transfer could allow
Japan to be more competitive in a market area where the U.S.
was the current leader. They also wanted to be sure that
the U.S. could force Japan to share its technology according
to a flow-back agreement., [Ref. 13:p. 12]
The Senate Armed Services Committee demanded that no
F-16 technology be transferred to Japan until the Memorandum
of Understanding was officially established. Dennis F.
Kloske, then the Deputy, Undersecretary of Defense, reported
to the committee that the U.S. sought assurances for a
thirty percent share of production work and a forty percent
share of the development work. However. many Japanese
officials considered forty percent of the development work
to be too high., [Ref. 13:p. 13]
The April meeting of the Senate Armed Services
Committee also added a provision to the Fiscal Year 89
Defense Authorization Bill mandating that the Secretary of
Defense consult with the Secretary' of -Commerce in
negotiating final terms of the FSX agreement. Not only did
this provision underscore the Congressional sentiment of the
commercial implications 'of the U.S.--Japanese defense
related technology, it also introduced a new player into
future defense contracts. (Ref. 13:p. 13) This will be
discussed in future sections.
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On April 27. 1988, the House Committee on Science
Space and Technology conducted hearings on ways to improve
cooperation in sharing foreign technology and U.S. demands
for foreign scientific & technical ination.
During the hearings, reference was made to two
diametrically opposed perspectives. One called for
restriction of access to U.S. science and technology,
taking the position that sharing such knowledge
undermines U.S. technological, superiority and economic
competitiveness. The second advocated the exchange of
technological ination via joint research and development
ventures because such ination gains would serve as a boon
to all participants by short cutting individual R&D
processes while gaining access to new materials,
processes, products, and productivity improvements.'
[Ref. 13:p. 14]
3. FSX Agreement Reached
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed on
November 29, 1988 and defined specific development work
shares and cooperative technology arrangements. According
to the MOU, General Dynamics and its U.S. subcontractors
were to receive 35 to 45 percent of the development work, at
an estimated 1.2 billion dollars. (Ref. 13:p. 13)
On January 12, 1989, a licensing agreement between
General Dynamics and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was signed
for technical assistance to build 130 aircraft. This
agreement was classified, but government statements and
press accounts indicate that it included the following:
1. The Government Accounting office estimated the cost of
the FSX at over $50 million per plane with $9 million
development cost per plane.
2. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries would be the lead company
in the license production arrangement, with General
Dynamicv as a partner.
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3. A 40 percent share of both development and production
programs would go to U.S. defense related
corporations, led by General Dynamics.
4. The total development costs would be borne by Japan -
approximately $1.2 billion.
5. The U.S. would have access, at no cost, to all
Japanese technology derived from the FSX project.
6. Production of the FSX would begin in 1994, with
delivery of the first FSX fighter to Japan in 1997.
7. The engines for tVe FSX would be either General
Electric or Pratt and Whitney, purchased off the
shelf by the Japanese. [Ref. .13:pp. 15-16]
The Defense Department estimated that the deal would
bring $2.5 billion into the U.S. and create 22,700 U.S. jobs
in development and productior. The U.S. would also have
access to any new technology in-vluding the miniaturized
phased array radar and radar absorbing materials. -These
radar absorbing materials consisted of layers of carbon
fibers coated with epoxy resin used in the wings. [Ref'.
14:p. 461J
4. FSX Under Bush
In rid January' of 1989. the Japanese and the
Pentagon were pressing for approval of the F-16. licensing
transfer of prodttion, to Mitsubishi. The Japanese wanted
the technical data from General Dynamics so that they could
begin letting contracts before the end of their fiscal year.
on March 31st. The Pentagon wanted this deal to ensure
that U.S.-Japanese security interdependence would be
maintained. They were concerned because of the delays
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already suffered due to long negotiations over U.S.-
Japanese work shares. [Ref. 13:p. 17]
The New York Times reported that the Defense and
'State Departments feared that a long delay would push the
Japanese to develop a plane on their own. This would
decrease the security interdependence of the two nations and
leave the U.S. defense industry without the technological or
financial benefits of the project. This report showed that
military and economic issues were fused even in the
Pentagon. The Pentagotn did seem to put security
interdependence above economic/defense industry concerns'.
Pentagon officials, however, were aware that "...aircraft
and weapons are among the few areas where the U.S. can keep
the trade balance with Japan in the black.", (Ref. 13:p. 17]
These economic and defense concerns helped to put
the FSX at the top of the Bush Administration's agenda. The
executive agencies, were increasingly at odds over the
precedence of issues for U.S.--Japanese foreign' policy.
U.S. Commerce and Trade Representatives made the'argument
that economic concerns were being overlooked. The Pentagon
maintained that national security, took precedence over
economics. The' FSX deal .again began to receive
congressional criticism. This time due to increasing
concerns about U.S. competitiveness, and technological
diffusion. (Ref. 13:p. 181
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The Senate used the confirmation hearings of James
Baker III (Secretary of State), Carla Hills (U.S. Trade
Representative), and John Tower (Defense Designate) to voice
concerns about the FSX agreement. They were concerned that
Japan would receive American aerospace and production
technology that would allow them to become more competitive
in the aerospace industry in the long run. [Ref. 13:p. 18]
During these hearings. "Senator Jesse Helms led other
critics in extracting a promise from the Secretary of'State
nominee James Baker III that the FSX issue would be
reexamined by the new Bush Administration." [Ref. 13:p. 19]
In late January 1989, Senators Helms, Bingamen and
nine others sent a letter to President Bush which was
critical of the way the FSX program was being handled. In
the letter they requested the technology transfer be
suspended until the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Energy, State, the Office of Trade Representative and' the
Office of White House Science Advisor could review the
arrangement. [Ref. 13:p. 19]' Senators Helms and Bingamen
had been opposed to this deal from the beginning. This may
have been just another excuse to delay or cancel the deal.
Senate Resolution 61 was introduced in February 1989
by Senator Dixon and 20 other Senators. This, resolution
called for a sixty day interagency review before Congress
received al notification of the l'icensing agreement. This
is important because after al notification,, Congress only
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has 30 days to disapprove it, or it goes into force. Five
days after the introduction of Senate Resolution 61.,24
House members threatened to introduce legislation
disapproving the arrangements if modifications were not made
to the FSX plans and if the Japanese did not provide certain
assurances. [Ref. 13:p. 20]
5. Interagency Debate
* There was also opposition in the Executive Branch to
the FSX deal. Commerce Secretary, Robert Moshbacher,' won a
three week delay in the project's implementation. He
persuaded President Bush to order the review of the joint
venture by the Commerce anad Defense Departments. This
review was completed on March 10, 1989. Then another delay
in the FSX approval was demanded by members of Congress
until an investigation of Mitsubishi's role in establishing
a chemical-weapons plant in Libya could be conducted.. [Ref.
13:p. 201
"A bitter interagency debate erupted over the
proposal to delay the transfer of F-16 technology to Japan."
[Ref. 13.p 201 The State and Defense Departments wanted
approval of the technology transfer in early February 1989.
They saw the FSX as an economic and strategic boon for, the
U.S. They were also receiving pressure from Japan for quick
approval so that contracts could be let by Mitsubishi.
However, critics, lead by Commerce Secretary Moshbacher,
wanted more intensive study of the project's long term
S45
effects. They wanted a sixty to ninety day delay to study
the effects of the joint venture on trade. The National
Security Council granted the delay on the grounds that the
agreement lacked specification. [Ref. 13:p. 211
One of the most important long range implications or
this debate was that Secretary Moshbacher managed to
convince President Bush that the Commerce Department should'
be included at the start of any negotiations that involve
the exchange of military or technology secretes.
President Bush proposed modifications, to the
Japanese, of the FSX agreement on March 20th. 1989. He
stated he would approve the FSX co-development plans if the
Japanese would accept nsw "clarifications". These
clarifications specified: (1) tighter restrictions on the
transfer of technology, particularly F-16 flight control
technology and weaponry source codes,, and (2) "a guarantee
that General Dynamics would receive a share of the estimated
$5 billion that Japan proposed to spend on FSX production."
IRef. 13:p. 221 The bureaucratic fighting between executive
agencies ended with the announcement of these
clarifications. [Ref. 13:p. 221
D. JAPANESE RESPONSE
At the time the U.S. was hcving second thoughts, the
controversy had also resurfaced! in Japan. Members of the
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party recommended that the
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project be scrapped if, the U.S. could not move forward.
They argued again for a purely domestic Jap. ,se fighter.
[Ref. 13:p. 22]
Many in Japan now saw President Bush's clarifications as
an attempt to change a deal that had already been reached.
The proposal "led to sharp expressions of irritation and
bitterness among Japanese officials." [Ref. 13:p.. 221
Japanese domestic noncerns were also leading to second
thoughts about the FSX. "In response to the. Bush
Administration's demands, Director General of Defense
Kichiro 'Tazawa stated "that Bush should respect what has
been agreed to..., the FSX agreement should not be changed,
and we went to ensure that it is not.'" [Ref. 13:p. 23] It
was again suggested by some in the Japanese Defense Industry
that Japan-drop the deal and build the fighter on its own or
in conjunction with a European country [Ref. 15:p. A141.
Secretaries Baker and Moshbacher, along with National
Security Advisor Brent Scrowcroft, met on March 23. 1q89
with Japan's Vice Minister of Defense and the Japanese
Ambassador. This was an attempt to seal the agreement.
While no agreement was reached at this meeting, the U.S., and
Japan did 'agree that the deal was still on. (Ref. 13:p. 241
,The clarifications were not enough for some Congressmen.
and Congressman Levine led a group tnat sent yet -another
letter to President Bush. In this letter they were
" .. insisting that, the U.S. pressure the Japanese into
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purchasing existing F-16 or other top of the line fighters
directly from the U.S. and abandon its cooperative
production plans." [Ref. 13:p. 241
Agreement was reached on, April 28, 1989 between the U.S.
and Japan to go ahead with the co-development plan. [Ref.
13:p. 25] The Japanese agreed to the clarifications. This
agreement included provisions for a forty percent share of
production work guaranteed to U.S. companies. Japan agreed
to safeguard sensitive computer software, and guarantee that
Japanese technology would flow to the U.S. [Ref. 15:p. A141
With the- agreement made, President Bush had to persuade
Congress.
E. THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE
On May 1. 1989, written authorization was submitted to
the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, by President Bush, in accordance with the Arms,
Export Control Act Section 36(d).. This process is called
certification. [Ref. 13:p. 251 It gives Congress a 30 day
oversight period to block foreign military agreements. This
blockage requires a two thirds majority in both the Senate
and the House. [Ref. 16:p. 221 In the case of the FSX.
they responded rapidly.
Congressional critics argued that the agreement was a
give away of U.S. technology. They believed that this would
allow the Japanese to develop their domestic aerospace
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industry which would hurt the U.S. aerospace industry. Some
of the most outspoken critics included Senator Alan Dixon
(D-ILL), Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Congressman Richard
Gephardt (D-MO), and Congressman Mel Levine (D-CA). Senator
Dixon and Congressman Levine both introduced legislation
disapproving the agreement. [Ref. 13:p. 261
There were also Congressional supporters that included
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-NY), majority leader of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Cranston (D-CA).
Moynihan (D-NY), Kassebaum (R-KS), Murkowski (R-AL),
Rockefeller (D-WV) and Leutenberg (D-NJ). They argued that
the joint project served U.S. national security and
industrial interests. They pointed out that Japan could
produce the plane domestically, but now will pay the U.S.
for assistance in the project. This will also improve U.S.
Japanese military ties and improve Japanese self-defense
capability. The agreement would also provide for sharing
new Japanese technology with the U.S. [Ref. 13:p. 27]
Secretary of State James Baker, Defense Secretary
Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State Eaglebuzger and Commerce
Secretary Moshbacher testified before the House committee on
May 3, 1989. They were attempting tO convintce skeptical
members that sufficient precautions had been taken to ensure
the protection of American high technology. [Ref. 13:p. 271
Cheney testified that the classified letters of
understanding between the U.S. and Japan that finalized
the agreement stipulated the creation of an American-
Japanese Committee in order to ensure that all provisions
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of the technical licensing agreement were enforced.
Members of this select committee would include
representatives from both the Commerce and Defense
Departments. Cheney also announced that the U.S. could
pull out of the project at any time if they believed that
the Japanese had not lived up to their end of the
bargain. [Ref. 13:p. 281
Senator Dixon's resolution, to disapprove the FSX
agreement was voted down in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but was sent to the full Senate recommending that
Dixon's resolution be blocked and that the FSX joint venture
project be approved. Senator Dixon's resolution was
blocked, but the S':rAte passed the Byrd Amendment on May 16,
1989. The Byrd Amendment requires the government to
determine and report annually on any U.S. technology used in
Japan's space or civilian aerospace industry that was
obtained by the Japanese in the FSX project. It also
requires the tracing and reporting of technology'transferred
to unauthorized third parties or U.S. adversaries.
The resolution was vetoed by President Bush on 31 July
1989 and "Bush blasted the resolution as an infringement on
his constitutional authority to negotiate with, other
countries." [Ref. 17 :p. 8111 The Senate' 'failed to override
the President's veto. This cleared the way for the co-
development agreement. (Ref. 17:p., 811)
This section has covered the FSX project from the
beginning to the point where It was approved by Congress.
It touched on several of the controversies surrounding the
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project with~out discussing thema in detail. The next section
will look at the objections and economic implications of
this project in greater detail.
V. OBJECTIONS AND VALIDITh° OF OBJECTIONS
TO THE FSX PROJECT
Section two discussed burden sharing from the economic
point of view and the benefits of international armaments
cooperation. Section three discussed the problems of burden
sharing and international armaments cooperation. Section
four was an overview of the FSX project, and introduced
problems encountered in the project. This section will
discuss more extensively the objeztions raised to the FSX
project, both in Japan and in the U.S. The three main,
objections raised to the FSX project (transfer of
technology, protectionism, and bureaucratic problems) follow
the pattern of problems discussed in section three.
The FSX cooperative venture resulted from the
intersection of U.S. domestic interests concerried about
the Japanese plan to build a new generation attack
fighter which would compete with aircraft produced by the
United States. The internationalists including the
aircraft industry, free trade interests in congress, and,
executive interest in preserving commerce in this sector
urged the President to support the FSX joint project. On
the other hand, the nqtionalists, including
protectionists interests in congress, the public and the
government pressed him to refuse' such technological
-cooperation and to force the Japanese government to buy
existing United States aircraft instead. Combined with
Japanese .threats that they would reconsider the Joint
Venture with the United States and either build their own
aircraft or seek technological cooperation with firms
outside the United States, these competing pressures
forced President Bush to support the Joint Venture, but
with clearly delineated conditions for reciprocal
benefits. [Ref. 13:p. 2]
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When the Japanese were shopping for a replacement to the
F-1 in the mid 1980's, both the Japanese Defense Agency and
the Japanese Defense Industry wanted to develop and produce
the fighter domestically.
But faced with U.S. demands to buy American, the
embarrassing controversy in the mid 1980's over the
Toshiba Corp's sale *of military sensitive equipment to
the Soviet Union, budgetary problems and skepticism at
home, the Japanese government proposed co-development of
a plane as a compromise. [Ref. 14:p. 4601
This section will begin by discussing the impacts of
canceling the co-development project on Japan and the U.S.
It will then go into what will be gained by the FSX project.
It will also provide an analysis of the FSX -agreement as it
relates to technology transfer, protectionism and
bureaucratic problems. The next section will provide
recommendations and conclusions on the FSX project.
A. IMPACTS OF'CANCELING THE FSX AGREEMENT
1. Co-Development Versus Purchase or Japanese
Independent Development
Even as late in the deal as March 1989 there were
still those in Congress who insisted that the U.S. scrap the
deal and "..pressure the Japanese into purchasing existing
F-16 or other top of the line fighters directly from the
U.S." (Ref. 13:p. 24] For the Japanese. this was never a
viable option. A country, just as. a rational individual,
will make the choices that are best ,for it. There may be
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concerns about trade deficits and adding to the
compatibility of the militaries, but there are many other
considerations which are important. In the end, a country
will do what it perceives to be best for that country
overall. In the case of the FSX. the Japanese government
believed that the best possible way to replace the aging F-i
fighter fleet was through a co-development deal with the
U.S. If it was not the best alternative, all things
considered, the Japanese would not have agreed to it.
The Japanese have not bought a U.S. military
aircraft outright since 1955. However, they have co-
produced the F-15, F-4, T-33, F-104, and P-3C with the U.S.
Japan also had a 15 percent share in the development of
Boeing's 767 and now are major contractors for production of
fuselage parts. Reportedly. they are achieving an advantage
over American producers in both cost and quality. Japan
also received a 25 percent share of the development.
engineering and production of components for the planned
Boeing 7J7 airpleane. which has been indefinitely postponed.
[Ref. 14:pp. 461-4631
MichaelsW. Chinworth, an associate with MIT-Japan
Science and Technology Program. stated "There is no way in
hell they were going to buy the planes right off the shelf."
(Ref. 14:p. 4611 The Japanese Defense Industry saw a long
term, .very expensive project. After the downturn. in
business caused by the appreci'ating yen and the slump in
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ship building, the defense industry looked to the FSX for
relief. In addition to the defense industry, the Japanese
public was eager to see new jobs created for the 30.9
billion dollar annual expenditure of tax payers money on
defense. [Ref. 14:p. 461] The Japanese Defense Force was
calling for Japan to reduce its dependence on the U.S. for
defense. In light of this domestic pressure. and the fact
that Japan had a history of co-production with the U.S., it
is unlikely that Japan would purchase a military aircraft
from the U.S. outright. The more likely alternatives were
to either develop and produce the aircraft domestically, or
enter a co-development agreement with another country.
Richard J. Samuels, Director of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. states,
The Japanese are going to develop it (the FSX) in
cooperation with us. or they are going to do it in an
environment in which we, will not have access. The
question is. do we'get on the train or not? [Ref. 14:p.
460]
Japan, who has been under pressure in the last few
years to take on a greater defense commitment. is on the
leading edge of technology. They have access to the
components of the best new weapons systenrs.and one of the
world's most vibrant economies. It was inevitable that





2. Impacts on the United States of the Likely Japanese
Response to Cancellation
When the Japanese began looking for a replacement
aircraft, the main aim of the U.S. Defense Industry, and
many members of Congress, was to keep from being shut out of
another lucrative Japanese market [Ref. 13:p. 91. In
addition to the possibility of Japanese domestic production,
there was the possibility of co-development with another
country, particularly a European nation. American FSX
defenders took the position that half a loaf is better than
none. General Dynamics concluded in a press release that,
considering Japan's initial intention to embark on the
project on its own, the FSX co-development agreement was the
best possible alternative.
In accordance with this agreement. U.S. industry
will receive 35 to 40 percent of the 1.2 billion dollar
development budget and a comparable proportion of the five
billion dollar production effort. This deal will bring
approximately 2.5 billion dollars into the U.S. economy and
will create 22,700 U.S. jobs in development and production.
[Ref. 14:p. 4611 While this boost tO the U.S. economy is
less than would have occurred if the Japanese had purchased
the F-16 off the shelf, it is a lot more than the U.S. would
receive if the aircraft had been developed and produced
solely by Japan, or by the Japariese and a third country.
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As a 1988 study entitled "The U.S. Aerospace
Industry and the Trend Toward Internationalization" stated,
this agreement comes at a time when.
The U.S. industry no lunger has the significant margin of
superiority it once had, nor the absolute technological
edge. The demands of a world market-place mean there is
often no alternative for U.S. firms other than
participation in various types of international
cooperative relationships. It is safe to say that only
by forming international business relationships can U.S.
manufacturing continue to compete. (Ref. 14:p. 4621
While aerospace is one of the U.S.'s most successful
industries, internationally the U.S. is not doing as well as
it once did. Commerce Department data shows that U.S.
imports of aerospace products has risen to 11 percent of
consumption. In the early 1980's, one third of aerospace
production was exported. Now one forth of aerospace
production is exported. In 1976, the U.S. held 49 percent
of world military sales. by 1986 this had dropped to 20
percent. Foreign com-etitors are now making a variety of
competitive commercial and defense products. Presently the
principle competition is from Europe, but some analysts
think that Japan will be' the long range threat. [Ref. 14:p.
462]
B. WHAT WILL BE GAINED BY THE JAPANESE FROM THE FSX
AGREEMENT
A 1970 MIT report indicated that Japan considers
aerospace to be, one of the key technologies for the 21st
century. ,It also appears that the Japanese intend to
57
;, •, , . 4/°,-
develop a military aerospace industry capable of export, and
that this military technology would provide the'basis for
their civilian aircraft industry. [Ref. 18:p. 10] To this
end, the Japanese government subsidizes commercial jet
engine development and "..,Japan has a growing competitive
advantage in many of the technologies now driving the
aerospace industry - advanced materials, micro-electronics
and computers." [Ref. 14:P. 462]
Booz-Allen and Hamilton, a consulting firm, expect the
Japanese aerospace production to grow to a 25-30 billion
dollar industry by the, year 2000 from a current production
of seven billion dollars. If Japan increased its defense
spending to over one percent of ONP, as the U.S. is
pressuring them to do, this will be even higher. [Ref.
14:p. 462] However, this growth will still be a fraction of
the U.S. aerospace industry.
The Japanese admit that the FSX is driven by the
benefits 'of commercial ties. Given the viable Japanese
economy and the access to leading edge technology, it seems
likely that the Japanese will move into the aerospace
industry. Industry analysts predict they will begin by
producing sub-components, then components and then continue
to produce -iore complex products. The U.S. aerospace
industry will probably first feel the effects of the
Japanese aerospace industry as a decline in the Japanese
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market, which purchased 2., billIon dollars worth of U.S.
aircraft and equipment in 1987. [Ref. 14:p. 463]
The following are some of the reasons given by industry
and technology analysts as to why Japan has not yet entered
the world aerospace market:
1. small domestic market
2. high cost of entry into a highly capitalized world
market
3. little aerospace engineering experience
4. little experience managing systems as large and
complex as commercial transports and advanced military
aircraft
5. no worldwide operations network
6. lack of key R&D capabilities. [Ref. 19:p. summary
page]
One of the key R&D capabilities, where the Japanese, are
behind the U.S and European countries, is in the development
and use of computational fluid dynamics software. This is
made possible by high speed high capacity computers. These
software programs "...can be used for detailed and accurate
analysis of transonic, supersonic and hypersonic fluid flow
and assist in designing more efficient airframe and wing
configurations." (Ref. 19:p.,8]
Currently Japan is prohibited from exporting military
technology, except to the U.S. through flow-back agreements.
but this is just government policy and subject to change.
Japan may eventually emerge in the military sales area as
Japanese firms see opportunities to profit from applications
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of the technology developed for commercial purposes. [Ref.
14:p. 463]
United States proponents of the FSX agreement see this
as a time to select partners in Japan while the U.S. has a
competitive advantage. Opponeats. on the other hand, see
now as the time to try to maintain our superiority in
aerospace industry. They say that this should be done so
that Japan does not overtake the U.S. in the aerospace
industry as they did in the auto.mobile and home electronics
fields. [Ref. 14:p. 463]
C. TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY TO BE TRANSFERRED
One issue raised by the FSX agreement was the specific
value of the technologies to be transferred, both from the
U.S. to Japan and from Japan to the U.S. This controversy
focused on the following four technologies:
1. the F-16C airframe
2. the comp site wing box
3. the avio ics source codes for mission and flight
control omputers
4. the phas d array radar. [Ref. 19:p.' summary page]
I. The F- 6 Airframe
The F 16 is a supersonic, multi-mission, day and
night fighter. The first operational F-16C was produced in
1982. Under t e FSX agreement. Japan "...would have access
to all associated airframe, avionics and life support
subsystems. except for those components that they either
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develop themselves or purchase directly from the United
States." [Ref. 19:p. 3] Jatpan will purchase directly from
the U.S. the engine, aft fuselage and wing leading edges,
along with other components and equipment. Japan intends to
develop and supply the avionics, radar, inertial navigation
unit, electronics warfare package. mission computer and
armaments system. In addition, the Japanese plan to modify
the fuselage by adding small vertical control fins *to the
bottom of the engine duct, stretch the fuselage, add a high
strength canopy and larger, all composite wings. The
aircraft will have to be modified to accept the Japanese
armaments and weapons, in addition to the new U.S. engine.
[Ref. 19:p. 41
This agreement involves the transfer of three basic
sets of data and ination. The first being operational data.,
This includes ination needed to fly,,maintain and repair the
aircraft. It contains flight and repair manuals, schematics
etc. Any country-who buys F-16's gets this ination, with
-the exception of components or systems not included in the
sale, such as certain weapons systems. [Ref. L9:p. 3]
A seconi set of data transferred will be
manufacturing data. This is detailed specifications on'
processing. materials, manufacturing and assembly, tool
design etc. Any country who is licensed to produce parts
for the F-16 receives the ination for the parts they are
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licensed to produce. Ten countries have co-produced the F-
16, including Denmark. Norway and Turkey. [Ref. 19:p. 4]
The third set of data is design and test data. This
data will be transferred to Japan due to the co-development
requirements. An example of this data would bedata on
aerodynamic studies of the wing structure. According to
General Dynamics and Air Force officials, the Japanese will
have access to raw test data only (i.e., the results of the
design and test studies) and not the knowledge base or
design techniques that generated that data. In addition.
they will only receive this data for the portions of the
aircraft that they are modifying. [Ref. 19:p. 4]
2. Composite Wings
The FSX will have'a composite, integrally co-cured
wing box. A wing box is the main structural element of the
wing that attaches to the upper and lower skin. Basically.
it is the ribs and spars in the wing. The lower skin will
be co-cured-with the box and the upper skin riveted to the
box. This means that the structural elements and the lower
skin wili be made by laying sheets of composite materials in
a mold and bonding them together by heat and pressur3 in a
process called curing. (Ref. 19:p. 41
The Japanese have developed the technology and know
how to produce these co-cured composite wing boxes. Part of
the FSX agreement calls for General Dynamics to receive the
Japanese wing design. molds and tooling. In addition, a
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number of U.S. materials, industrial, and mechanical
engineers will receive instructions on the Japanese process.
[Ref. 19:p. 5]
Most of the development of the composite wing will flow
from Japan to the United States. General Dynamics will
assist in integrating the wing to the airframe. [Ref.
19:p. 51
3. Avionics Source Codes
Avionics is the collection of electronic equipment
and software used in the aircraft. The Japanese will
provide the radar, electronic 'warfare unit, inertial
navigation unit and fire control (mission) computer. Part
of the FSX controversy revolves eround the' source codes
(computer programs that instruct a computer to receive,
process and output ination) needed for the mission and the
digital fly-bp-wire control computers. Fly-by-wire means
that electrical impulses are sent to solenoids to operate'
the aircraft control surfaces, instead of using hydraulics
or mechanical connections to control the aircraft. As wing
and tail surfaces are reduced, drag is also reduced. This
increases efficiency, but reduces stability. The advanced
fly-by-wire flight control computer can compensate for this.
"The flight control computer would continuously monitor the
aircraft's stability and manipulate its control surfaces."
[Ref. 19:p.10] The fly-by-wire flight 4,ontrol systems are
beginning to be used on commercial aircraft. Therefore the
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F-16 flight control source codes have a potential for
commercial spin-off use.
The modifications of the forward fuselage will
change the flight characteristics of the aircraft. The
flight control computer coordinates the flight control
system and controls the various control surfaces according
to preprogrammed flight modes. This. along with the use of
a Japanese mission computer, will require source code
modification. The U.S. source codes for the U.S. flight
control computer will be withheld and the Japanese will
develop software codes indigenously for the flight control
computer to be used in the FSX. Japan will receive the
computer software codes to enable them to integrate their
fire control system into the FSX, but only those software
codes essential to integrate the fire control computer,
called the mission control computer by the Japanese, will be,
transferred. Similar codes are already provided to the
Japanese for the co-production of the F-15.
4. Phased Array Radar
Phased array radar' utilizes an array of elements
instead of one' element to transmit and receive radar
signals. The first advantage of this system 'is that the
beam is directed electronically instead of with a mechanical
radar antennae. Thus, the beam can scan more quickly and
more reliably. The second-advantage of this system is that
multiple targets are tracked simultaneously because
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different parts of the system transmit while others receive.
Because the Japanese are solely developing this'system, the
U.S. will not receive this technology free. However, the
U.S. will have access to the basic design, perance aia cost
data and be able to purchase or license the technology if
they desire. [Ref. 19:p. 71
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report claims
that the U.S. has known this technology for over 12 years,
yet this seems to be the technology, that the U.S. is most
interested in obtaining [Ref. 20:p. 181. The U.S. does have
phased array radar,. however, the B-i Bomber is the only
operational aircraft that carries it becauseit is the only
one whose'mission requirements' justify the high cost [Ref.
19:p.101. Secretary of Defense Cheney argued that the U.S.
is not looking necessarily for the technologies, but for the
manufacturing applications the Japanese have developed. He
also stated that we are seeking Japanese expertise in
miniaturization and low-cost manufacturing for the phased
arrayradar components. He stated that the U.S. would like
to use this radar in the Advanced Tactical Fighter and that
the U.S. can produce a key component for this system at a
cost of 8,000' dollars each. The total cost of this program
would be about eight million dollars. He sees this project,
among other benefits, as a way to reduce the cost of this
particular component and therefore reduce the cost of the
new Tactical Fighter. [Ref. 20:p. 181
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D. ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Proponents of the FSX agreement state that only 1970's
technology will be diverted to Japan. They argue that this
technology is basically the same as the F-15 aircraft which
the Japanese have been co-producing for the past ten years.
Thus, they already have access to this technology. However.
this statement does not take into account the transfer of
design and test data that will be needed due to the co-
development nature of the project. Proponents also state
that the technology for a F-16 and a wide body commercial
jet are completely different and therefore technology
integration is not a realistic threat. In response to
oppcnents who believe that the U.S. will be giving away
billions in, technology, proponents answer, that the Air Force
spent less than one billion dollars in the 1970's to develop
the F-16. and this is basically the technology that the
Japanese will receive. Opponents to this agreement counter
that the technology is not old because the aircraft has been
continually upgraded since its development. [Ref. 18:p. 3]
There is' concern that the U.S. technology that Japan'
gains from the FSX project will be transferred to a third
country. This is prohibited. without U:S. approval, by the
clarifications. In addition, a Technical Steering Committee,
will be established to monitor the transfer of technology
and Japanese compliance. However, history shows little,
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government oversight or control on the transfer of
technology. As an example:
Toshiba sold sensitive quieting technology to the
Soviets, enabling their submarines to go undetected by
U.S. sonar. A more recent, but similarly illustrative
and damaging event was the role Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries played in the production of the Libyan
chemical plant. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is a prime
contractor for the FSX. (Ref. 21:p. 5]
The U.S. will withhold some military sensitive
technologies, such as:
1. nuclear delivery capacity of the F-16
2. advanced medium range air-to-air missiles
3. low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared system
for night use
4. engine hot sections and electronic fuel control
technologies.
There is a possibility of licensed production in Japan
of U.S. engines in the production phase, but this would come
under a separate memorandum. The engines for the first six
prototypes will be bought off the shelf from General
Electric or Pratt & Whitney. [Ref. 20:p. 18]
According to Vernon Lee, Vice President for General
Dynamics' Ft. Worth Division and FSX Program Director,
There will be no transfer of any technology involved in
the U.S. advanced tactical fighter or advanced tactical
aircraft programs General Dynamics is involved in. Only
existing F-16, technology will be transferred. (Ref.
20:p. 171
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E. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTIONISM ISSUE
Opponents to the FSX agreement believe that the FSX wil"
spur the Japanese aerospace industry. They point out that
the experience that the Japanese will gain by integrating
various technologies into one aircraft is important and
could help them develop their own civilian aviation
industry. In response to those that say fighter and
commercial aviation technology iS different, they reply that
a 1982 GAO study showed that Japan incorporated F-15
technology, learned from a F-15 co-production arrangement,
into the NU-3000 Diamond Corporate Jet. They also used the
same production line for the NU-3000 that was used for the
F-15. [Ref. 21:p. 41
On the other hand. General Dynamics and the Department
of Defense state that the F-16 technology and fighters in
general have little potential for commercial spin-off.
Fighters require more rigid, stronger structural designs and
specialized wing designs due to the requirements to fly in
excess of Mach 2, carry a variety of armaments and per
stressing maneuvers at high speeds. rRef. 19:p. 8]
It appears that the production of a small corporate jet.
which may use small jot technology, is far different than a
large airliner. Secretary of Commerce Moshbacher stated that
he "...thought the transfer of military technologies would
not substantially improve Japan's ability to compete with
the U.S. in the commercial transport field." [Ref. 20:p.
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171 Secretary Moshbacher also said that 2.5 to 3 billion
dollars worth of work would be gained by U.S. industry due
to this project. He states that this is close to the amount
that U.S. industry would have received if Japan had bought
F-16's off the shelf. [Ref. 20:p. 161
The FSX deal will provide the Japanese with several
advantages in the aerospace industry. It will transfer some
U.S. technology and expertise to the Japanese, even if some
state that this is not leading edge technology. It will
also provide Japan with a generation of aerospace engineers
experienced in the design of high perance aircraft. And. it
will assure a massive flow of capital to expand the Japanese
aerospace industrial infrastructure. [Ref. 18:p. 111 Greg
Rubinstein, a er Pentagon official,now Vice President of a
Washington trade and technology consulting firm. stated.
What the FSX will do for the Japanese commercial aircraft
industry will close the gap somewhat. But I do not see
them pulling in the front ranks in the foreseeable
future. [Ref. 14:p. 462]
This project will certainly assist the Japanese in the
long •-un. But, the threat to U.S. aerospace industry will
not come from the FSX itself. By the time the FSX is ready
to fly i.i the late 1990'so. the U.S. will have two new
supersonic aircraft available for export. This indicates
that the Japanese will not immediately be taking customers
away from the U.S. (Ref. 21:p. 3]
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During the FSX debate, many congressmen argued that
Japan would "...just take American technology and use it to
crack one of the last bastions of U.S. competitive
strengths: the civilian aircraft industry." [Ref. 22:p. 14)
But the secrets that Japan may be able to get from the e¶-1
are outweighed by what we stand to receive in return.
A sustained exchange of U.S./Japanese military technology
would benefit both us and the Japanese - probably us more
than them. It would guarantee the t,;o nations
f iternational preeminence in military technelogy, nourish
their bilateral security relations, and insulate them
against the geopolitical uncertainties of the coming
decades. [Ref. 22:p. 14]
As stated above, the Japanese intend and are expected to
move into the aerospace industry. They have the economic
power and the technology to begin moving slowly into this
area. If the U.S. cancels the FSX agreement, the Japanese
either produce the aircraft domestically or with a European
country. There is every indication that they will not buy
an American fighter off the shelf, so this is not an option
for the U.S. Therefore, withholding U.S. technology, by
canceling the FSX agreement. would slow down Japanese entry
into the aerospace industry at best. This would also impose
a cost on the U.S. defense industry.
'F. BUREAUCRATIC PROBLFMS
An FSX agreement had been struck in November of 1988,
under the Reagan Administration. When the Bush
Administration took over, it began to receive congressional
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pressure to reexamine the agreement. During the conation
hearings of James Baker, Carla Hills and John Tower,
"Senator Jesse Helms led other critics in extracting a
promise from the Secretary of State nominee James Baker III
that the FSX issue would be reexamined by the Bush
Administration." [Ref. 13:p. 19] During the next six
months there was a rash of infighting among the U.S.
Congress thdt culminated in additional restrictions.
President Bush referred to these restrictions as
clarifications.
These clarifications were considered by the Japanese to
be a reopening of negotiations in a "done deal". In
addition, the Japanese were trying to get the agreement
approved by March 31, 1989, the end of their fiscal year, so
that they could begin letting, contracts. The U.S. Congress
seemed to' ignore the fact that an agreement had already been
signed and that the Japanese were concerned about the coming
end of the fiscal year. Congress did not approve the
agreement until June 1989. [Ref. 13:p. 29]
During this time there was pressure in Japan to scrap
the program and reconsider a purely domestic ,fighter if the
U.S. could not move forward. [Ref. 13:p. 22] Considering
the 'actions of the U.S. Congress, the scrapping of this
agreement by the Japanese may have been the best course of
action for Japan, the U.S. Defense •ndustry and Congress.
Congress acted as if they were the only player' in this game.
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and that Japan and General Dynamics did not matter. They
took an agreement that had been signed, and managed to draw
it out for another year and a half. If the Japanese had
scrapped this agreement. it might have gotten the attention
of Congressional leaders and convinced them that they are
not "the only game in town." Scrapping this deal would have
cost the U.S. defense industry about 2.5 to 3 billion
dollars, plus access to advanced technology, according to
Secretary of Commerce Moshbacher. While this would have
been a blow to the defense industry, and the U.S. in
general, it cculd have been looked at as an investment in
future arrangements.
It is true that there are those in both Japan and the
U.S. who are not happy with this arrangement. There are
those in Japan who wanted to loosen the ties to the U.S. and
who thought that Japan would learn more from the production
of this aircraft if it was produced solely in Japan. The
U.S. may have actually cut down on the Japanese learning
curve with the co-development agreement. There are those
in the U.S. who are concerned about the transfer of advanced
U.S. technology, to a potential competitor and those that
want to protect the U.S. defense industry. In spite of
this. negotiators for both countries were doing what they
considered the best possible alternative for them. If
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negotiators in either' country bad not considered the FSX
agreement to be the best possible alternative then the
agreement would not have been made.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The FSX program was both an economic and military issue.
Many in the U.S. saw the replacement of the Japanese F-l's
as a chance to reduce the U.S.--Japanese trade deficit.
However, this would be thwarted by Japan's plan to build the
aircraft domestically or to co-produce it with another
country. Also at issue was the effect on the competitive
capability of che U.S. and Japanese aerospace industries.
Opponents were afraid thdt the Japanese would use the FSX
deal to obtain U.S. aerospace design, development, and
productive expertise and then challenge U.S. producers in
the international market. [Ref. 14:p. 461],
A. COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY
In the case of the FSX. the knowledge or technology of
the F-16 was 15 to 20 years old. It had been upgraded, but
it was not the leading edge of present technology. However.
the technology that was expected to be gained from the
Japanese by the U.S. was leading edge technology'and was
going to include a new aircraft. The Japanese should have
been more concerned about technology transfer than the U.S.
They were giving up the leading edge technology of the
phased array radar and the procedure for co-curing.
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There are those who were concerned that the Japanese
would use this project to increase their ability to compete
in the world wide aerospace market. The Secretary of
Commerce has stated that his concern over the project's
effect on America's industrial base and competitiveness were
satisfied by the clarifications. He also stated that the
agreement would not hurt U.S. economic or security interests
and that he was satisfied with U.S. access to Japanese
technologies.
While there will always he concerns of this nature when
two countries, or companies, are working together on a joint
project, the advantages of the project must be considered.
If the advantages outweigh the risks, then the project
should be undertaken. In the case of the FSX, the
advantages do seem to outweigh the risks. The U.S. will
receive leading edge technology and will not be giving away
our advantages in other areas of the aerocpace industry.
The Japanese will be gaining the development of a top of the
line fighter and'modifying that fighter to meet their 'needs.
In this case both countries in the agreement win. -This is
as it should be.. If one party was not deriving any benefits
from the agreement, then the agreement should not be entered
into.
As discussed previously, when a country concentrates on
the area where it has the comparative advantage there is
more for everyone. In this case, the U.S. has already
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produced the basic fuselage for the FSX and the Japanese
have produced many, of the advanced electronics. By
combining these two advantages, the benefits of
international armaments cooperation will be realized.
Whenever there is a -project of this size and importance
there will be those who will find fault with the agreement.
This is not necessarily bad. Those who find fault with an
agreement force those who propose the agreement to look at
it from all sides. There should be a forum for debate on
these issues, but the best forum may not be the floor of
Congress.
B. CONGRESS AND EXECUTIVE INTERVENTION
An interesting aspect of this -project is that Congress.
and other executive agencies, felt free to intervene in
Presidential negotiations with other countries. Examples
include:
1. The Senate Armed Services Committee added a provision
to the Fiscal Year 1989 Defense Authorization Bill
requiring the Secretary of Defen'se to consult with the
Secretary of Commerce before negotiating final terms
of the FSX agreement [Ref. '13:p 13].
2. Eleven Senators sent a letter to President Bush
requesting that the Departments of Commerce, Defense.
Energy, State, the Office of Trade Representative and
the Office of the White House' Science Advisor review
the agreement [Ref. 13:p. 19].
3. The Secretary of Commerce convinced President Bush
that his department should be included at the start of
any negotiations that involved the exchange of
military or technology secrets,[Ref. 13:p 21].
4. The Byrd resolution. passed by Congress but vetoed by
President Bush, placed additional requirements for
76
tracing the use and transfer of technology from the
FSX project [Ref. 23:p. 3].
The intense interest of Congress and executive agencies
such as the Departments of State and Commerce indicate a
growing awareness that defense and economic issues are
intertwined, and are likely to become even more so. The
effects of defense spending and burden sharing will become
an even' more important issue as we push our' allies to'
increase their share of the total defense spending of the
alliance. This will mean a continueu increase in the ar'mount
of attention 'given to defense issues by previously
unconcerned, or minimally concerned, agencies.
The increased attention on. burden sharing and
international armament agreement matters should lead to
better decisions if handled in the proper forum. However,
there is a cost for these "better decisions" since
Presidential power in. dealing with our allies will be
decreased to some extent. The forum must be efficient at
debating the issues and rendering a decision promptly so
that the system. does not- become even more cluttered. it'
*will also have to understand how international trade and
defense effect our economy and the economies of our allies.
In addition, this forum must be efficient at separating the
facts from the rhetoric of special interest groups. As more
and more people/agencies become involved in the decision
making process. there will be more and more special interest
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groups trying to influence their decisions -- as occurs in
Congress.
Our allies will be unwilling to devote more resources to
defense 'unless they perceive a greater benefit. This
benefit could be defense itself, if there 4s resurgence of a
threat. However, with the fall of the Warsaw Pact in
Europe, this seems unlikely. Therefore, there must be
economic incentives for this increased defense spending.
The U.S. cannot insist that other countries purchase high
tech U.S. weapons while they do not gain any engineering,
scientific. industrial, or economic benefits from these
purchases.
Since there is not a way to'exclude Congress and other
executive branch agencies from intervening in these defense-
economic matters (and many would argue that this is their
job, therefore they should not be excluded), these issues
must be integrated, together so that they can be considered
simultaneously. However, the Senate Confirmation hearings
are probably not the proper place to address these issues.
An additional question that emerges from this study is
to whet extent the U.S. should rely on other. countries for
their technology and defenp= systems. The U.S. could'demand
that only U.S. producia weapons Systems be allowed, but as
stated in section -chree. this has been the policy in the
U.S.S.R and tI-is policy has not been'a success.
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There seems to be a need to establish a procedure to
integrate defense and economic issues. This forum will
also have to decide to what extent defense items can be
produced in. and purchased from, other countries.
These questions are areas for further research.
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